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VII. ARE THERE MENTAL INFERENCES
IN DIRECT PERCEPTIONS?
DAN D. CRAWFORD
HILE there is virtually a consensus among
Wcontemporary
philosophers of perception

of perceptual experience are sense data or sense
impressions on which we base our perceptual
that some form of direct realism is true, there is judgments about physical things. Hence the direct
less than complete agreement about whether nor- realist asserts that perceptual knowledge is direct
mal, direct perceptions involve mental inferences and noninferential in the sense that it does not inin any sense. In taking another look at this recur- volve an inference from a prior knowledge and
rent question, my aim is twofold: first, to examine awareness of sensory items to the perceptual judgsome of the arguments and evidences that have ment about physical things.
There is a second sense in which it may be said
been offered in favor of inferences and to see if
that
normal perceptions are directly of physical
they can be accommodated within the direct realist
things,
namely that it is physical things in their
framework, and second, to attempt to clarify and
physical
settings that are phenomenologically
defend the insight of direct realism that normal
present in perception. Consider this remark from
perceptions are noninferential.
Let us recall the two central claims of direct Romane Clark:
realism. First, as a form of realism it accepts from
Perceptions are directly of things and happenings in our
common sense the idea that the world includes
physical surroundings. 'Directly' here means that however
among its constituents physical objects having
complicated the causal path may be from environment to
sensible properties and existing unperceived. The
perception, what we experience are items of our physical ensecond and distinctive thesis of direct realism is
vironment and not surrogates, or images, or intermediaries
of them.'
that perceiving organisms are capable of having
direct or noninferential knowledge of these same
physical objects and their sensible properties. In In this passage, Clark seems to be making a
normal circumstances, someone's perceiving that phenomenological claim about what is present in
there is a red book in front of him is a case of our perceptual experience, or at least what he is
knowing that there is a red book in front of him. saying depends on such a claim. And the claim can
And what one perceives and has knowledge of in hardly be denied: it would be grossly inaccurate to
this case is the actual physical book in its physical describe what is present in our perceptual exsurroundings.
perience when we look at a large tree as a fleeting,
But what exactly is meant when it is said that mental sense datum, image, or appearance. What
this knowledge is "direct" and "noninferential"? we take ourselves to be encountering in this exThe answer given by direct realists has a positive perience is rather a very substantial part of the exand a negative side. On the one hand, they assert ternal world.
that our perceptual judgments refer to external
We should keep the distinction between these
physical things, and on the other hand, they deny two senses of "direct" clearly in mind in order to
that normally we make any additional judgments guard against a possible fallacious argument
that refer to items other than physical things. In against inferences. For it might be argued that
particular, it is denied that the immediate objects since the things and happenings that we perceive
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are uninferred in the sense that they are present in
experience, then the corresponding perceptual
judgments must likewise be uninferred from any
antecedent judgments. But this would be a
mistake for it is perfectly possible to maintain
both that ordinary perceptual judgments are conclusions of inferences, and that the things intended by these culminating judgments are what is
finally perceived and present in the experience. In
the remainder of this paper, we will be concerned
mainly with whether normal perceptual judgments
are products of inferential reasoning from antecedent judgments.
What is an inference? and why should anyone
think that the term can be applied to the mental
activity that occurs in perception? The primary
use of the term occurs in the context of forensics.
We make inferences when we
in thought
from a premise to a conclusion, taking the premise
to be a reason or evidence for our conclusion. A
further implication of the common meaning of
an inference-one
which is often
overlooked by philosophers- is that the subject
must in
sense be awaref' the premise which
is the basis of his inference. Anthony Quinton
makes a closely related point about inferences in
perception:
If [an inferential theory of perception] is correct two conditions must be satisfied. Statements about experience must
count as reasons or evidence for statements about objects
and they must in some, no doubt rather obscure, sense be accepted by those who make statements about objects .... A
fact cannot be a man's reason or evidence for an assertion
unless, however implicitly, he is aware of it.'

This primary use of "inference" will guide us in
our investigation of perceptual inferences. If ordinary perceptual judgments are the result of inference, then the following conditions must be
met: 1) whatever plays the role of premise in the
inference must be a state which occurs prior to the
perceptual judgment; 2) the subject must in some
way be aware of this State. We may note immediately that the second condition assures that
whatever functions as a premise must be an item

of experience, and not a physiological occurrence
in the eye or brain.
I. COMMON
SENSEAND INFERENCE
We d o not usually think of peceptions as inferential. Rather we are accustomed to think that
we make inferences from the things that are present in perception to things that are not Present.
For example, when I claim to see from the swelling
On
daughter's arm that she has a mosquito
bite,
sense would be
t o admit that I
had made an inference, though not a conscious
one, from what I do perceive, the swelling, to
what I d o not perceive, that the swelling was
caused by a mosquito. If I find out that my
perceptual belief was mistaken and that what I actually perceived was a pimple and not a mosquito
bite, then I might say that I had wrongly inferred
that the swelling on her arm was caused by a masqUitO.
sense
not admit that
perceptions of ordinary objects such as arms and
swellings involve inferences. The reason for this
seems to be simply that these objects are present in
our experience, and as such are not inferred. Admittedly there is no sharp line separating
is
present and what is not present in experience. But
ordinary objects such as arms and swellings can be
inferred only if there is something more basic that
is perceived from which the inference can be
made, and common sense does not recognize any
such things.
A further point that this case brings to light is
that common sense willingly speaks of an inference even though there is no conscious process
of inferring. I judge immediately that what I
perceive is a mosquito bite. I am not aware of any
inferential step by which I pass from an awareness
of the swelling to a conclusion about its cause.
This enables us to see that the absence of any conscious process of inferring is not a criterion for the
absence of any inferring at all. Indeed if it were,
then it would have t o be allowed that even
judgments about the pathways of subatomic particles and about other people's feelings and
thoughts are not mediated by inference, since
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these judgments need not involve any conscious
reasoning. But we certainly do not want to go this
far in disallowing inferences.
Let us now turn our attention to some of the
reasons for thinking that perceptions are, after all,
conclusions of inferences, and that the verdict of
common sense must be reversed. We will deal first
with an argument proposed by Gilbert Harmon
based on a certain understanding of perceptual
knowledge; next we will consider the implications
of the attempts of cognitive psychologists to explain perceptual illusions; and finally we will examine the implications of the idea, accepted by
direct realism, that perceptions are mediated by
sense impressions.
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According to Harmon's explanation, the man is
making this inference:
1) it looks as if there is a candle over there
2) normally, when things look a certain way it is because

they are that way
3) present circumstances are normal
4) so, it looks as if there is a candle over there because there
is a candle over there.

It should be noted that the conclusion of the man's
inference involves a claim about the cause of his
perceptual experience. Harmon is certainly correct
in saying that what the man concludes is not simply that there is a candle in front of him, but also
that there is an unbroken causal connection between the candle and his perceptual state. Consequently, what the man believes about the perceptual object is not entirely true, and therefore canIf perceptions are instances of knowing, then not be an instance of knowing.
the judgments (and beliefs) included in them must
And yet we may still wonder whether it is
be justified, and it is reasonable to think that or- necessary to postulate an inference in this case.
dinary perceptual beliefs are not self-justifying, The perceptual evidence that is leading our man
but are justified through other beliefs. Gilbert astray is his mistaken belief that perceptual condiHarmon, in his recent book Thought, has argued
tions are normal. We know that conditions are not
that it is necesary to invoke inferences from
normal, and so we are in a position to see that his
perceptual evidence in order to explain both orperceptual belief about the object and its relation
dinary direct perceptions as well as "Gettier exto him rests on a mistaken belief. But even if the
amples involving direct perceptual kn~wledge."~
man's perceptual belief (so far as he knows) is supThese Gettier examples are "easily accounted for"
ported by his belief that conditions are normal, it
if we suppose that direct perceptual knowledge is
is not clear that this latter belief is the premise of
based on inference, but not otherwise. One of the
an inference. It should be noted that our man's
examples discussed is as follows:
belief that conditions are normal is itself a complex perceptual belief which has its own justifying
A man looks and comes to believe that there is a candle
evidence.
But is it plausible to think that when the
directly before him. There is a candle there; but a mirror inman
looks
at what is before him, he first judges
tervenes to show the reflection of a candle actually off to
that
conditions
are normal, and then judges that a
one side. The man's belief is justified and true; but he does
not know. If his belief is the result of inference, his failure to candle is there? It is far more probable that when
know is easy to understand. Since inference attempts to find his senses are appropriately stimulated, the belief
the best total exaplanatory account, he infers an explanation that conditions are normal arises concurrently
of the way things look. He infers that it looks to him as if
with the belief that the candle is there. And if this
there were a candle before him because there is a candle
is so, then the former belief cannot serve as the
there and because of the normal connection between the way
things look and the way things are. Since that explanation is premise of an inference. Our examination of this
essential to his conclusion but is false, he does not come to case shows that one can have and give evidence for
one's perceptual belief without its being true that
know that there is a candle before him even though his belief
is justified and true."
one has used this evidence in a process of in-

86

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

ference. Similarly, one can have reasons for judging that a particular act of killing is wrong without
having arrived at this judgment by a process of
reasoning.
There is, however, another deeper issue raised
by Harmon's inferential theory, namely whether
direct perception should be understood on the
model of inferences to the best total explanation
of one's sense experience. For we can agree that
sense experiences d o occur before the perceptual
belief. We will deal with this important issue in a
later section of this paper.

Do the explanations of normal perceptions
given by cognitive psychologists give evidence for
unconscious inferences? We will attempt to
answer this question by considering a case of
perceptual illusion, for we have learned from
perceptual psychology that the very same
mechanisms that determine normal perceptions
also produce the illusions.
Consider the familiar Muller-Lyer illusion
figures in which the vertical axial lines A and B,
though objectively equal, appear unequal.

The perceptual psychologist, R. L. Gregory, has
given a plausible explanation of this illusion in
terms of perspective-depth cues suggested by the
line configurations which elicit the mechanism of
size-constancy s ~ a l i n g The
. ~ figures are perceived
as simple perspective drawings suggesting depth.
The lines going out from A are (unconsciously)
seen as coming toward the perceiver, as when the

corner of a room is viewed; the lines going toward
B are seen as going away from the perceiver, as
when the near corner of a building is viewed. A is
then perceived as more distant than B on the basis
of these distance cues, and consequently A is
enlarged due to a "perceptual compensation"
which holds the size of objects nearly constant
despite variations in their perceived distance. It is,
then, the perceived depth of A in comparison with
B which is responsible for the enlargement of A.
What are the implications of this account for inferences? Let us suppose that the relevant content
of the perceptual judgment in this case is that the
vertical line A is larger in size than the corresponding line B. It is reasonable to interpret Gregory as
saying that this perceptual judgment is the result
of a mistaken inference from an antecedent sense
experience of equal lines. We can reconstruct the
pattern of this unconscious inference as follows:
1) it looks as if lines A and B are equal
2) it looks as if A is more distant than B
3) if two objects have the same apparent size, but one appears more distant, then the more distant object is larger
4) so, A is larger than B.6

The main argument in favor of this inferential
hypothesis is that it seems to be implicit in the
given psychological explanation of the illusion.
After all, the thrust of that explanation is that the
perceiver is engaged in a process of size-scaling,
that is, enlarging one line and diminishing the
other, and that this revision is the resuit of a
perceived variation in distance. Gregory
acknowledges that the factor of distance or depth
is not finally "seen," it is only "indicated" by the
lines. But he also shows that the lines can be seen
as varying in distance in special circumstances in
which they are viewed as luminous figures against
an invisible background, and moreover that the
perceived distortions in size are "very highly correlated" with this apparent depth.' It is difficult to
avoid the conclusion that when one views the illusion, one is somehow taking account of depth at a
deeper level of perception. The inferential
hypothesis, then, seems to be correct, in saying

ARE THERE MENTAL INFERENCES IN DIRECT PERCEPTIONS?

that the subject moves by an unconscious inference from a primary experience of equal lines
that look as if they vary in distance to the perceptual conclusion that the lines are unequal.
But we should query whether this account is
correct in identifying this primary experience of
equal lines with a sensation. For suddenly it dawns
on us that the experience has all the characteristics
of a perceptual state. It involves an intentional
reference to things outside the perceiver, viz. lines
that are spatially related. The experience is an
elementary taking, and as such lacks the character
of givenness that has traditionally been ascribed to
sensations. Thus it seems we must modify the inferential account we have given to say tht the subject makes a calculation based upon a prior
minimal perception of equal lines varying in
distance.
What can be said about our awareness of
underlying perceptions of this sort? We have laid
it down as a condition of making an inference that
the subject must be implicitly aware of the
premises of his inference. Since we are not consciously aware of the depth-perspective cues in the
Muller-Lyer figures, then our modified inferential
account must hold that we are unconsciously
aware of these factors, where this means not only
that we are experiencing them but that we have
some idea or conceptualization of what we are experiencing.
There are several considerations which make it
plausible to think that the minimal perceptions we
have described are awarenesses. First, we should
note that it is common to speak of unconscious
awarenesses in other contexts such as Freudian
psychology with its acceptance of unconscious
desires and beliefs, as well as recent theories of
language that explain linguistic competence in
terms of the unconscious knowledge and application of a system of rules. Second, in viewing the
premises of our inferences as perceptual states, in
which the subject makes an intentional reference
to external objects, we make them suitable candidates for awarenesses. And finally, the fact that
the subject can become consciously aware of the
perspective cues in the drawings, and in some
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cases can even cancel their effect and come to see
the lines as equal, suggests that he was visually
aware of equal lines even before he gained an
understanding of the illusion.
The instance of perceptual illusion that we have
examined has implications for normal perception.
For it is reasonable to suppose that other instances
of size-constancy scaling that result in veridical
perceptions also involve mental inferences. While
the conclusions of these inferences are not direct
perceptions in the sense of being uninferred,
nevertheless since they are inferred from minimal
direct perceptions and not sensations, then the inferential theory we have defended is not in conflict
with the central thesis of direct realism- that normal perceptions are not inferred from sensory
states. Finally, we allow that our inferences
culminate in visual experiences, and that what is
inferred is directly perceived in the sense that it is
present in the subject's experience.
IV. ARESENSE
IMPRESSIONS
PREMISES
OF INFERENCES?
If all perceptions are mediated by antecedent
sense impressions, then it may be that we are
aware of these sense impressions and pass from
them by an inference to our perceptual conclusions. While direct realists generally agree that
there are sense impressions, they do not agree
about how to characterize them or about their role
in perception. We will begin our discussion by
giving a constructive account of sense impressions
which draws heavily on the theory put forward in
recent years by Wilfrid S e l l a r ~We
. ~ will then go
on to consider whether sense impressions can
figure in perceptual inferences.
Since, according to direct realism, our perceptual judgments refer to physical objects and their
properties, and since it is these physical objects
that are present in the perceptual experience, then
sense impressions are not the immediate objects of
perceptual awareness. They are not rival objects
of perception. We must postulate sense impressions to explain certain features of perception,
which means that they are inferred entities in yet
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another sense of this slippery word.
We theorize that sense impressions are mental
occurrences that intervene between the physical
stimulus and the final perceptual awareness. As
such, we may expect that sense impressions have
properties that link them to their physical stimulations, but also properties that provide the "raw
material" for their consequent, full-blown perceptions. T o account for our awareness of perceptible
objects, we attribute to the sensory state properties which correspond to, but are not identical
with, their sensible properties. When holding a
ball in one's hand in normal conditions, and
perceiving by touch that it is a ball, one has a sense
impression of something 'spherical', 'hard', and
'smooth' (where the single quotes indicate the
unique predicates that designate properties of sensory states).
Accordingly, the perceptual process should be
understood as having three separate stages,
causally linked: the purely physical stimulus,
which gives rise to the mental sense impression,
which in turn gives rise t o the "conceptually rich"
perception. But it will not do to say simply that
sense impressions causally mediate perceptual
awarenesses, for they have a far more intimate
connection with those awarenesses. We can only
account for the sensuous, nonpropositional
character of perceptual states, if we accept a
strong form of the Kantian doctrine that the sensory "matter" is literally taken up into the perceptual experience and seamlessly united with
it - although as we shall see in a moment it can be
significantly altered in the process.1°
What, then, must be added to this admittedly
crude sketch of sense impressions in order to permit them to serve as premises of inferences? As we
have seen, the subject must be aware of them in a
sense which implies that he has formed some idea
of them. Consequently, those philosophers who
wish to say that perceptual judgments are inferences from sense impressions must hold either
that sensing is itself a kind of knowing, or if it is
not that we have direct knowledge of our sense impressions whenever they occur.
We may now take note of the fact that direct

realists hold divergent views on this point. Wilfrid
Sellars argues that sense impressions are "nonconceptual representations" that we are not normally aware of; Roderick Chisholm, on the other
hand, holds that whenever we are sensing in some
way we know that we are sensing in that way."
Since philosophers have always maintained the
closest connection between being in a conceptual
state, and being aware that one is in that state,
then the question of inferences seems to boil down
to whether or not we are always aware of how we
are sensing.
Presumably, we are sometimes aware of how we
are sensing in the (dispositional) sense that we can
give noninferential reports about how we are sensing. I can know noninferentially that I am sensing
'intense heat', or that I am sensing something
'spherical', 'hard', and 'smooth'. But granting this,
it is still highly doubtful that we are always aware
of how we are sensing. My chief reason for saying
this is that there seem to be many cases in which
there are great discrepancies between what is
sensed and what is perceived. In our earlier discussion of the Muller-Lyer illusion we found a
disparity between the way the two lines appeared
in conscious perception (as unequal in size), and
the way they appeared at a more primary, but unconscious, level of perception (as equal in size, but
varying in distance). We referred to the latter appearing as a minimal perception. We should expect to find even greater disparities between
perceptions (minimal or maximal) and their
underlying sensory stimulations.
Let us look at a case of such a discrepancy, one
which will also help to clarify the idea that sense
impressions are postulated occurrences. The
psychologist, Grace Adams, related the following
quaint but revealing personal experience:
I was looking out of a window, watching for the streetcar,
and 1 saw through the shrubs by the fence the brilliant red
slats of the familiar truck; just patches of red, brilliant
scarlet. As I looked, it occurred to me that what I was really
seeing were dead leaves on a tree; instantly the scarlet
changed to a dull chocolate brown.I2
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Adams then states that she tried to "recover the
red" by imagining the streetcar, and found that
she could "redden the leaves somewhat," but could
not obtain the original scarlet. Nor could she
recover entirely the later dull brown color. Finally,
she reports, she went out to see what the actual
color of the leaves was and found it to be a distinctly reddish brown color.
What should we say about Adams' sense experience as her perceptual experience changes
from brilliant red to chocolate brown? Let us limit
our discussion to the aspect of color. A possible
view is that Adams is not sensing any colors that
she does not perceive: she is not sensing brown at
the time she perceives the red slats, nor is she sensing red at the time she perceives the brown leaves.
One might take this line if one wished to avoid
having to postulate sense experiences of which we
are not consciously aware. But this is a highly implausible view. It seems rather that there must be
some basis in the sense experience for these alternate perceptual states. Adams must be sensing
reddish brown throughout the experience, though
unconsciously, while perceptually judging and seeing, first, due to her strong expectation, that the
red streetcar is behind the leaves, and second, that
there are only dull brown leaves there.
What stands out in bold relief from this example is that our sense impressions are not always on
the surface of, and discoverable in, conscious experience. Furthermore, this case is interesting
because what is sensed is not merely supplemented
in the perception, but positively revised and overruled. The reddish-brown sense experience is
transformed into a brilliant red perceptual experience. In order to recover her original sense experience, Adams had to cast off her perceptual
awareness that the brilliant red streetcar was there.
Her final perceptual judgment that there were
reddish-brown leaves before her was the perception that most faithfully reproduced her sense experience.
There are many illustrations in the textbooks of
perceptual psychology of this kind of case in
which there are large discrepancies between what
is sensed and what is perceived. Indeed it may be
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said that the main task of the psychology of
perception is to reveal the disparities between sensation and aspects of the commonly perceived
world such as the permanence of objects, their
motion, and "constancy" of size, shape, and
brightness, and to specify the perceptual structures and laws that account for these differences.
Commenting on the perception of shape and motion, Julian Hochberg writes: "The sensations
seem to become completely unobservable, and
totally submerged in the overall organization of
the perceived object."13 It is this "submerged"
character of sensations that should give pause to
those who wish to say that we are always aware of
how we are sensing, and consequently to those
who support inferential processes.
We can probe more deeply the question at issue
by asking whether a sense impression is itself a
conceptual state. At what point in the perceptual
process does one begin to respond thinkingly, and
by means of concepts, to information from the
body? Is it at the level of sensation, or at some
higher level? The question cuts deeply, and
crystallizes opposing theories in the philosophy of
mind. Ultimately, our judgment about inferences
depends on the answer we give to this question.
We can perhaps throw some light on this difficult issue by suggesting what seems to be a
natural way of grouping the relevant terms. We
note, first, that at the level of sense experience one
does not represent things as being outside of one's
body in physical space. What is sensed does not include what Gustav Bergmann calls "the idea of external e~istence."'~
Further, it seems reasonable to
take this absence of externality as a sign that the
subject has not begun to conceptualize a world.
We therefore propose that we should speak of a
subject's conceptual activity only at the level at
which he begins to represent physical objects standing over and against his own physical being.
More simply, we should speak of a subject's conceptual activity only when he begins to perceive
the world, for perception is essentially a state or
condition in which a subject of experience
represents, and gains knowledge of, physical
things. This proposal has the effect of reinforcing
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the distinction between nonconceptual sensations
and conceptual perceptions, and if it has any basis
in our understanding of these concepts, as 1 think
it does, then it provides additional support for the
central thesis of direct realism that sensations are
not themselves thoughts that function as premises
of inferences.

The aim of this paper has been to clarify and defend the central insight of direct realism that normal perceptions of physical things are noninferential in the sense that they are not the product of inferences from antecedent sensory states. Three
lines of argument, opposed to direct realism, and
in favor of perceptual inferences, were considered
and found wanting. First, a consideration of the
requirements of perceptual knowledge revealed
that perceptual beliefs are indeed based on
evidence, but this fact does not commit us to a
theory of perception as an "inference to the best

total explanation" as Gilbert Harmon argue\. 'I he
fact that we have and can give evidence for thew
beliefs does not imply that we have used t h i j
evidence in a process of inference. Second, a
careful examination of the explanation given by
cognitive psychologists of the familiar MullerLyer illusion led to the conclusion that cases of
this sort give evidence for saying that many ordinary perceptions are the result of inferences
from minimal perceptions, although not from sensory states. Finally, those opponents of direct
realism who accept the thesis that normal perceptions are inferences based upon antecedent sense
impressions must also accept the thesis that we are
normally cognitively aware of these sense impressions. However, consideration of a paradigmatic
case in which there was seen to be a major
discrepancy between the sensory state and its consequent perception made it implausible to think
that sense impressions are usually accessible to introspective awareness. Hence the mental processes
by which we pass from what is sensed to what is
perceived should not be viewed as inferential.'"
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